We study empirically the dynamic properties of the limits to arbitrage in the sovereign bond market around a period of market distress. The recent credit crisis offers a unique opportunity to investigate the economic causes of limits to arbitrage. We consider markets that were liquid pre-crisis, and use pairs of sovereign bonds that have been issued in two foreign currencies, i.e. usd and euro. A simple theoretical arbitrage relationship links their credit spreads. While these bounds are within bid/ask spreads during the normal time, they are severely violated during periods of financial stress. As an example, in December 2008
approach, we find that investors require different premia on usd-and euro-denominated bonds of the same issuer. Thus, the assumption of currency-independence may lead to seriously mispriced credit products in the market. It is empirically incorrect to treat usd spread as de facto reference currency in the valuation of foreign-denominated credit products of the same issuer, and hence, the credit pricing models should be built taking into account the funding risks which are specific to each corresponding currency.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 outlines the results in the literature that are related to our work. Section 3 gives the theoretical framework for our empirical investigation of the dynamics of limits to arbitrage, including the definition of currency dependence and the derivation of cross-asset arbitrage in an intertemporal setting. Section 4 details the data selection and discusses the possible determinants that explain the dynamics of limits to arbitrage. Section 5 gives the methodology use to obtain the credit spread curves via the Joint Estimation Method, and discusses the price discovery and the fixed-effects panel regressions concerning the LtA. Section 6 discusses the empirical results. Section 7 concludes.
Literature Review
This paper is related to three streams of the asset pricing literature. A vast body of work investigates market anomalies that appear to be unrelated to economic fundamentals. A part of this stream studies the predictability of asset returns and presents evidence that stock returns are predictable either based on past earnings (the post-earnings announcement drift puzzle by Bernard and Thomas, 1989) , and short-run momentum effects (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) . A second part of this literature investigates the behavior of relative asset prices and violations of the LOP, including the Siamese-Twin stocks puzzle by Rosenthal and Young (1990) , the Palm-3Com spin-off puzzle by Lamont and Thaler (2003) and put-call parity deviations by Ofek et al. (2004) .
1 While our study is more directly related to the latter, an important point of differentiation is both the structure of our data and type of questions we ask. The empirical analysis is based on data from a very large market, and potential violations are systematic and persistent, as opposed to being related to a set of isolated events. Our LtA proxy is obtained in a fairly simple framework, in a context in which security pairs have nearly matching cash flows, and can be analyzed empirically in a market with high liquidity and data accessibility. Moreover, our empirical framework allows us to address a different question than the previous related literature, namely whether limits to arbitrage are state-dependent. We try to quantify the relative importance of different sources of risks to explain limits to arbitrage and their interaction during systemic events. A second stream of the literature studies the implications of financial constraints on the equilibrium asset prices. This literature has taken two directions. The first deals directly with different type of financial constraints, such as short selling (Tuckman and Vila, 1992) , equity capital borrowing (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997 ) and the role of collateral value (Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, Fostel and Geanakoplos, 2008) , limited risk capital (Gabaix et al., 2007, Garleanu and , market liquidity risk (Acharya and Pedersen, 2005, Mitchell et al., 2007) , leverage constraints (Gromb and Vayanos, 2002) and banking frictions (Allen and Gale 2004) . A second part of this literature studies the implications of these frictions in terms of welfare and public policy. Gromb and Vayanos (2010) highlight the role of specialized institutions in the optimal allocation of capital and their impact on socially optimal decisions, and whether this has relevant public policy implications. Krishnamurthy (2010) argues that the financial crises, including the subprime and Lehman collapse, provide a compelling example that government intervention can be important for the smooth functioning of financial markets. One can view these government interventions as a way to reduce limits of arbitrage in financial markets, thus closing the gap between market prices and fundamental values. Since the financial sector can have a systematic role for the allocation of resources in the real economy, financial distress may lead to welfare costs. Geanakoplos and Polemarchakis (1986) show that in the presence of market frictions, market incompleteness create the possibility of Pareto improvements triggered by public intervention. In that sense, the research on limits to arbitrage is linked to the debates on the optimal design of public policies during financial crises.
Our paper is also related to a third stream of the literature that deals with credit risks and derivatives pricing. It is common market practice among investment banks, data suppliers (i.e. Reuters and Bloomberg) and rating agency companies (i.e. Moody's and Standard Poors) to employ usd as an input to price the credit risk of products that make reference to the same issuer, even across different currency denominations (Merrill Lynch, 2000) . The major assumption is that the FX market is liquid and deep enough to make the usd a perfect substitute for other currencies. Studies of corporate spreads have suggested that credit spreads can be decomposed into three components: default, tax and risk premia (see Elton 2 Little attention has so far been given to the risk premiums in a multi currency setting. Domowitz et al. (1998) discuss the response of country/currency risk premiums to market volatility; Kercheval et al. (2003) argue that risk premiums of a single issuer, across two currencies, should be of the same sign and magnitudes; Ehlers and Schönbucher (2004) highlight the impact of the sudden devaluations (jumps) on the differences between the risk premiums across two currencies; Jankowitsch and Pichler (2005) suggest that the cross-sectional risk premiums must be identical for a single issuer as long as the default variables and exchange rates are uncorrelated; and finally, Landschoot (2008) shows how corporate credit spreads in two different currencies (i.e usd and euro) of two different issuers (i.e US and Euro Zone) respond to various yield and market factors.
Theoretical Framework
In order to explore the concept of limits to arbitrage in the sovereign Eurobond market, we first briefly outline the credit spreads properties in a frictionless economy when a country issues bonds across two different currencies: usd and euro. This leads to the definition of currency dependence of credit spreads, and the discussion of the underlying assumptions that make it equal to zero. Then, we use these results to define a variable called LtA (Limits to Arbitrage) that is defined as the deviation from the theoretical no-arbitrage relation that should prevail in a frictionless economy. In the empirical part, we will use this variable to study the relative importance of difference sources of frictions that can impair this link. how cross-currency credit risk premiums should behave in the market. Their results support that the credit risk premium of a single issuer cannot be explained by only a unit-free default risk. This implies that credit risk premiums, empirically shown to be related to unit-bearing determinants, may indeed differ across currencies. Refer to Fons (1987) to see whether the actual default rates of low-rated corporate bonds are representative of the risk premiums required by the investors. To study papers that divide corporate credit spreads into various components, refer to, for example, Duffee (1999) , Driessen (2005) , Ericsson and Renault (2006) , Chen et al. (2007) and Feldhütter and Lando (2008) .
Eurobonds in Emerging Markets
A Eurobond is a bond issued in a currency other than the currency of the sovereign (or corporate) that issues it. Given local currency and potential governance risk, the majority of emerging countries issue Eurobonds denominated in usd and/or euro, with maturities ranging from 1-30 years. 3 Compared to the euro market, the usd market is more liquid, and is larger in terms of outstanding volume. This reflects the historical differences of the two regions: Europe has been mainly driven by a bank-based system, while the US has relied on a market-based structure. Although the issuance of euro-debt declined considerably following the 2001
Argentina crisis, a new trend of euro funding occurred in emerging markets starting from 2004, and after 2005 both euro and usd markets became broadly similar in terms of activity and issuance.
In all known instances of foreign default, countries have always defaulted on their foreign denominated debt independently of their currency of denomination. For this reason, it is common to assume that default probability is unit-free and unique to the issuer, suggesting that the risk premia across currencies are identical. This eliminates the influence of default probability in the differential of expected cash flows between bonds in different currency denominations. Let us define Currency Dependence (CD thereafter) of country j at time t as follows:
Therefore, the Currency Dependence is the differential of the premia that the sovereign pays for the two Eurobonds denominated in the two foreign currencies. In general, in a frictionless economy it may be argued that the choice of a numeraire should not affect the properties of asset prices and returns (i.e. level of expected returns, volatility, autocorrelations). Kercheval et al. (2003) argue that if the company issues bonds across currencies, one can suppose that the credit risk is a function of that company's creditworthiness only, and not of the currency the bond is issued in. They derive a covered interest arbitrage condition, where changes in credit risk premia (of a single issuer) across two currencies are perfectly correlated. Similarly, Jankowitsch and
Pichler (2005) prove that currency dependence must be equal to zero under the assumption of zero correlation between credit spreads and exchange rates, i.e. CD j (t, T ) = 0. One could therefore define as a proxy of the extent of arbitrage violation a variable LtA j (t, T ), with LtA j (t, T ) = CD j (t, T ). A joint hypothesis of zero correlation and no friction is equivalent to test whether H 0 : LtA j (t, T ) = 0. If correlation is non-zero, however, the currency dependence may be non-zero even in absence of frictions. Thus, in what follows, we discuss how currency dependence is affected by the correlation between credit spreads and exchange rates.
Cross-Asset Arbitrage in Intertemporal Setting
Consider a frictionless economy in which a single sovereign issues bonds in two foreign currencies: usd and euro. The risk premiums of these bonds are denoted as S usd (t) and S euro (t) for usd and euro, respectively. Consider a strategy in which an arbitrageur at time t can long the euro-denominated credit risk S euro (t) via buying euro-denominated Eurobond of country j for an amount equal to M e , and short an equivalent amount of usd-denominated credit risk S usd (t) via selling usd denominated Eurobond of the same country for an amount equal to M e /X t , where X t denotes the USDEUR exchange rate (euro per unit of usd) at time t. At time t + δt, the credit risk premiums would be S euro (t + δt) and S usd (t + δt), respectively. Similar to the theoretical setting of Gromb and Vayanos (2010) , this arbitrage strategy has two interpretations, both representing real arbitrage situations. In the first interpretation (i.e. cross-asset arbitrage), there are two different assets, and arbitrageurs use usd-denominated bonds to hedge their positions in euro-denominated cash flows. In the second interpretation (i.e. intertemporal arbitrage), there is one asset, and arbitrageurs take advantage of the price anomalies of a single asset at different points in time. 8 The two interpretations yield the same basic insight: the equilibrium prices of Eurobonds are closely related to the level of risk-aversion of arbitrageurs against exogenous shocks, which pull prices away from fundamentals. For this reason, in the empirical analysis we split our time period into three different sub-sets: pre-crisis, crisis, and after crisis periods, presumably affected by different levels of risk aversions.
The arbitrageur's profit (loss) of the strategy denominated in euro, ∆Π t is: 
Or, equivalently
The expected profits of the arbitrageur is directly affected by the covariance between the credit risk premium and the USDEUR exchange rate. According to the uncovered interest rate parity,
1+r $ , with r being the risk free interest rates t and t + δt. Dividing by X t , we obtain:
However, if the covariance is not zero, the arbitrageur would earn (normal) expected profits given by the expression on the right hand side of Eq. (7). We call LtA the deviation of the profits from the parity defined as follows:
For instance, if the covariance term were zero then if E S In the rest of the paper, we focus on the dynamics of LtA for three sovereign markets before, during, and after the credit crisis. The existence of a value for LtA significantly different than zero can be interpreted in two different ways: (a) Markets are inherently inefficient, and hence, there exist inherent arbitrage opportunities (b) Markets are inefficient because arbitrageurs are unwilling (or incapable) to take arbitrage positions. We first estimate LtA over different periods to see how frequently LtA is within the bid/ask spread bounds. Then, under a magnifying glass we study the periods in which we observe violations that imply the existence of an unused arbitrage opportunity, and investigate what specific factors drive these violations. This is important since it can help our understanding of market behavior, and shed some light on the debate between neoclassical economics, behavioral finance and the limits to arbitrage literature.
Data Description
The weekly data set covers the period July 2005 -April 2010, and is divided into three main sub-samples (and two further sub-samples for crisis period). Bernanke (2009) 
Eurobond Yields
The data set for Eurobonds is based on two different sources: Bloomberg and Reuters 3000 EXtra. Weekly bid-ask yields and prices for euro-and usd-denominated bonds for four maturity buckets (1-3 years, 3-6 years, 6-9 years and 9-15 years) are retrieved from Bloomberg for the three largest EM sovereign issuers who issued in dual currencies: Turkey, Brazil and Mexico. 9 It must be noted that these countries are the only ones that issued sufficient amount of bonds across both currencies during the given time interval. Characteristics of bonds are collected from Reuters 3000 EXtra: all bonds have fixed coupon rates and are neither callable, puttable, structured nor convertible. Brady Bonds are excluded. 10 To minimize the problem of bond illiquidity, prices are collected as Bloomberg Generic (BGN), which are generated by removing extreme values, and taking weighted averages of quotes (firm and indicative) submitted by a minimum of five brokers. Firm quotes are often assigned a higher weight than indicative quotes. Bloomberg Fair Value (BFV) prices, which are obtained via optimization algorithms, are not used in our data set. The number of bonds denominated in usd are greater than that in euro for all maturities, and the number of long-term bonds are greater than that of short-term bonds. As of July 2005, the number of usd-and euro-denominated bonds are displayed in Table 1 .
[Insert Table 1 here]
For the estimation of EM risk premiums, we need to identify the proxy for risk-free curves. Grinblatt (2001) suggest using swap rates as default-free benchmarks; similarly, Houweling and Vorst (2005) argues that swap curves are preferable than the government curve as a corresponding proxy. Feldhütter and Lando (2008) make a similar argument. In our paper, we use both the swap rates and the interbank rates as the benchmark 9 The given Emerging Markets are also members of Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Markets Equity Index.
As of 2008, MSCI consists of China, Indonesia, Philippines, Korea, Malaysia, Taiwan, Thailand, Pakistan, India, Russia, Israel, Jordan, Egypt, Turkey, Morocco, South Africa, Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary, Peru, Mexico, Chile, Colombia, Brazil and Argentina. 10 Claessens and Pennacchi (1996) argue that the prices of Brady bonds, having third-party guarantees, do not accurately reflect a country's fundamental creditworthiness, and hence require additional adjustments to capture the effects of the given credit-enhancements. [Insert Table 2 here] Table 2 highlights the statistics regarding the mean and volatility of the corresponding risk premiums. In all three sample periods, Turkey on average pays the highest risk premium in usd, followed by Brazil and Mexico. This ranking is consistent with Moody's credit ratings during the majority of the period when Turkey had the lowest bond quality, and Mexico had the highest. 11 Furthermore, Turkey is higher and more volatile in its usd risk premiums than it is in the euro risk premiums. On the contrary, Brazil and Mexico, on average, pay higher and more volatile risk premiums in euro. 12 In short, however, it is easily observed from Figure 1 that the usd and euro risk premia are not identical for the given three emerging countries during the given sample period.
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[Insert Figure 1 Here] Moreover, the risk premiums of Turkey, Brazil and Mexico in both currencies tend to increase in bond maturities. On the other hand, the same relation does not always hold with respect to bond volatilities. Credit risk premiums are highest between 1 September 2008 and 31 March 2009, which is consistent with our labeling this period as the credit crisis period. Table 2 clearly reveals that the magnitude and volatility of risk premiums increases monotonically from pre-crisis to the credit crisis period. The magnitude of usd risk premiums during the pre-crisis ranges from 6 basis points for bonds maturing in 1-3 years, to 165 basis points for bonds maturing in 9-15 years. While this range increases to 13 basis points for 1-3 year bonds and to 210 basis points for 9-15 year bonds during the liquidity crisis, the jump is even more substantial for bonds maturing in 1-3 years and 9-15 years, for which the increase is 150 and 515 basis points, respectively. During the credit crisis period, credit spreads traded at levels more than four times than their pre-crisis values, highlighting the far-reaching impact of the financial distress and illiquidity conditions to sovereign markets that were apparently not directly linked to the sub-prime crisis. The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy severely dislocated periphery bonds markets. It is interesting to observe that during the after-crisis period spreads levels of these sovereign bonds started to converge back not to their pre-crisis levels, but to their liquidity crisis levels, thus ranging from 60 basis points for 1-3 years bonds, to 270 basis points for 9-15 years bonds. A similar pattern can be found for their volatilities. Table 2 also reveals that the exact same pattern holds for euro risk premiums. While several studies focused on the dynamics of the level of credit spreads, our interest however is on the differential between usd and euro risk premiums. We observe that the absolute differentials during the pre-crisis period range between 1 to 33 basis points for 9-15 years bonds. During the liquidity crisis, this range rises up to 2 basis points for 6-9 years bonds and 45 basis points for 1-3 years bonds; during the credit crisis, the differential becomes 6 to 120 basis points for bonds maturing in 6-9 years and 1-3 years, respectively. We need to wait until the after-crisis period to see the differential to converge back to a range between 5 and 70 basis points for 3-6 years and 1-3 years bonds, respectively. These numbers are dramatic and 11 In December 2009, however, Standard & Poor's downgraded Mexico's credit rating from BBB+ to BBB. 12 For further research, it would be interesting to investigate whether regional or economic proximity plays a role in the average and volatility of an issuer's credit risk premiums across currencies. 13 Notice that Figure 1 summarizes the results for the 5 year maturities. Graphs for other maturity buckets are available from authors upon request.
their persistence is very important for our understanding of no-arbitrage theory. Two implications emerge. First, investors require different compensations for usd-and euro-based credit risk, and the difference between the two widens considerably during periods of market distress. The market convention of using usd as a de facto reference currency in the valuation of foreign-denominated credit products is empirically incorrect and can lead to seriously mispriced credit products, especially if long-dated. This argument is also in line with the finding of Breger and Stovel (2005) that accurate that risk and pricing models need to include currency dependent factors, because spreads on all bonds from the same issuer are driven by different factors. Second, even large markets, such as sovereign bonds, can be subject to substantial limits to arbitrage. We can study their dynamics to understand their economic properties.
Limit to Arbitrage -LtA
Figures 2A-2C summarize the behavior of LtA, revealing three important elements: (a) During the precrisis period, LtA is not significantly different from zero: cross-asset arbitrage holds to a great extent and arbitrageurs can enforce equilibrium relationships; (b) during the crisis period, LtA values are large and highly volatile, suggesting that arbitrage relationship no longer holds empirically with the arbitrageurs, who are likely to be unable or unwilling to provide the liquidity necessary to enforce the LOP.
14 It is also observed that violations are considerably higher during the credit crisis than they are during the liquidity crisis. This suggests that credit uncertainty has a first order effect on the dynamics of no-arbitrage relationships. (c)
During the after-crisis period, LtA is gradually converging back to the levels prevailing in the liquidity crisis, not to those prevailing in the pre-crisis phase. This suggests that markets are in the process of stabilizing, with arbitrageurs relatively more capable of participating in financial markets and bringing asset prices back to fundamentals; and yet, the memory of initial market dislocation still affects asset prices. 15 This points out an element of inertia in financial uncertainty. These findings hold consistently for all countries and all maturities.
[Insert Figures 2A-2C here] Table 3 summarizes the summary statistics of the absolute values of LtA. Both the first and second moments of LtA tend to rise with the time-to-maturity of the underlying bond. In addition, the average and volatility increase monotonically from the pre-crisis to the credit crisis period. In the pre-crisis period, LtA fluctuates around zero by small magnitudes, ranging from 3 basis points for bonds maturing in 1-3 years, to 8 basis points for bonds maturing in 6-9 years. This indicates negligible constraints on arbitrageurs' activity.
Later, during the liquidity crisis, the average LtA ranges 10 basis points for 1-3 year bonds, and 16 basis points for 3-6 year bonds. LtA levels increase even more sharply during the credit turmoil, ranging from 50 basis points for 1-3 year bonds to 90 basis points for 9-15 year bonds, thus increasing, on average, by more than ten times their pre-crisis levels. This is when the Eurobond markets enter their most distressed phase: either arbitrageurs were seriously constrained to access the capital necessary to absorb arbitrage opportunities, or behavioral biases were preventing arbitrageurs to close the gap. We also find that LtA in the after-crisis period bears close resemblance to the values during the liquidity crisis, implying once again that markets are gradually converging back to initial levels, but at a speed which is not consistent with standard theory and 14 LtA is almost sequentially positive and negative during this period. A high volatility (fluctuation) of this nature may bring the mean values close to zero. This gives indeed a valuable guidance on how to interpret the corresponding LtAs: if one is to simply evaluate the period by mean values, one would be seriously mistaken. 15 We take FED's monetary policies as signs of economic stabilization in the after-crisis period.
expectations. In the after-crisis period LtA range between 12 basis points for 1-3 years bonds and 22 basis points for 9-15 years bonds.
[Insert Table 3 here]
In order to appreciate LtA levels and its volatility, it is interesting to run a comparative analysis with the corresponding bond bid-ask yield spreads, which are also expected to widen during unstable periods, due to bond illiquidity. We find that although the bid-ask spreads indeed widen during the market distress, the increase in LtA far outstrips bid-ask spread bounds. We consider two main aspects: (a) the expected value of the differential between the absolute LtA value and the bid-ask yield spreads, the latter having been estimated as the difference between the bid and ask prices divided by the mid prices across both currencies, (b) the differential between the volatility of LtA and the volatility of bid-ask yields. Table 4 shows that in the pre-crisis phase, the first measure ranges between 0 basis points for 1-3 year bonds and 7 basis points for 9-15 years bonds. This suggests that any potential arbitrage opportunity is economically irrelevant during this period.
On the other hand, during the credit crisis, arbitrage opportunities, net of bid/ask cost, range between 48 and 80 basis points for 1-3 years and 9-15 years bonds, respectively. The differential is more than ten times the values in the pre-crisis period. Something other than transaction and liquidity costs must be at play to disallow arbitrageurs from providing liquidity to market and enforcing the LOP.
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[Insert Table 4 here]
Determinants of LtA
Arbitrage strategies in the EM Eurobond markets are carried out mainly by financial institutions like proprietary trading desks of investment banks and hedge funds. Any arbitrageur who wishes to implement a risky-arbitrage, as described in Section 3, needs to raise capital by either selling assets or borrowing funds. While investment banks can fund their operations with unsecured lines, hedge funds more commonly use secured funding agreements to implement their trade and source leverage. During normal market conditions, either funding strategies can be used without much difficulty. During times of financial distress, for instance around the Lehman collapse, this no longer holds: access to lending becomes limited through the secured funding channel, and collateral value takes center stage. Goldberg et al. (2010) points out that this is due to the shortages of lending in the market. Krishnamurthy (2010) argues that the reason is linked to funding restrictions (i.e. repo financing and haircuts), counterparty risk and risk-aversion, each reinforcing a contagious vicious cycle.
Since we are interested in studying the determinants of the dynamics of LtA, we consider the following potential sources of variation: Liquidity risk, Funding Risk, Macro-Activity Risk, Term Premia, Local and Global Equity Premia, Sentiment Risk, Perceived Tail Event Risk, and Subjective Uncertainty. Since Roll (1988), Goetzmann et al. (2005) and recently Longstaff et al. (2008) show that shocks to US financial markets have global effects, we decide to divide most determinants into two main categories: Global (US) Factors and Local (EM) Factors.
Funding Factors
• Liquidity and Frictions: Bond traders know that liquidity can have a profound impact on asset prices.
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) examines liquidity under two components: asset's market liquidity (the ease with which the asset is traded) and traders' funding liquidity (the ease with which traders can access funding). In their paper, they argue that traders do influence, and are influenced greatly by market liquidity conditions, and that the tightness of liquidity forces them to become reluctant in taking positions in high-margin securities, which in turn reduces market liquidity and increases volatility.
-Amihud and Mendelson (1986) argue that liquidity is a significant factor in the pricing of corporate bonds. In addition, Longstaff et al. (2005) point out the fact that a large portion of corporate spreads is due to default risk, but the time-varying nature of the non-default component is strongly related to bond-specific illiquidity. Similarly, Acharya and Pedersen (2005) find that corporate bonds carry a substantial liquidity risk premium. 17 Hence, in our context, one could argue that idiosyncratic (or bond-specific) illiquidity may create a considerable amount of cross-sectional variation in the non-default component of risk premiums. We construct a weighted average bid-ask based measure of bond-specific liquidity as suggested in Amihud and Mendelson (1986) . Assuming b is a bond of country j with time-to-maturity m denominated in usd, the weighted average bid-ask spread, namely BIDASK, is calculated as follows:
where w is the weight of bonds in the given maturity group, and P rice M id is defined as the mean of bid and ask spreads of the bond in the given maturity group.
-A second measure of liquidity has been suggested by Buraschi and Menini (2002) and Fontaine and Garcia (2009) . This measure captures global bond market liquidity from the repo specialness of U.S. Treasury on-the-run bonds. In the US, the repo market is a key funding market. Fontaine and Garcia (2009) measure the value of funding liquidity from the cross-section of on-the-run premia by adding a liquidity factor to an arbitrage-free term structure model. They argue that the premium of on-the-run U.S. Treasury bonds should share a common component with risk premia in other markets, such as LIBOR loans, swap contracts and corporate bonds. We use the Fontaine and Garcia (2009) proxy of liquidity, which we label FG-Liq, to capture the effect generated by a global (U.S.) liquidity factor.
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• Funding Risk : In theory, it is assumed that arbitrageurs have unfettered access to all capital markets. However funding costs depend on the level of capitalization and the risk of financial intermediaries.
The empirical literature finds that the risk premiums, inherent in bond yields, tend to rise with tighter funding conditions. As discussed in Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009), there are generally two types of 17 Refer to Goldstein et al. (2007) for the effect of increasing transparency on corporate bond liquidity. Refer to Mahantia et al. (2008) for a discussion about latent liquidity and appropriate measures of liquidity risk in corporate bonds. 18 Their funding liquidity value exhibits significant variations during normal and crisis periods. In particular, during the 1987 crash, the Peso devaluation of 1994, Long-Term Capital Management (LTCM) failure of 1998, and the recent 2007 liquidity crisis. We refer to their paper for in-depth discussion.
traders involved in arbitrage opportunities: prop desks of investment banks and hedge funds. Although each of these traders chase similar arbitrage opportunities, they usually operate under different funding markets. While hedge funds borrow and lend against collateral on secured terms (secured arbitrage), investment bank prop desk participate in unsecured money market operations (unsecured arbitrage). Furthermore, as discussed in Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) , commercial paper is an important source of financing (also known as money market financing) for the financial sector, playing a central role during financial crises. In this context, it is important to capture how difficult it is to roll-over risk-arbitrage positions to take advantage of market dislocations, and fund large relative value positions. Thus we divide the Funding factors into three components: (i) Unsecured Funding (OIS spread), (ii) Secured
Funding (MBS spread) and (iii) Commercial Paper (CP). Following the Lehman bankruptcy, there were large and persistent shocks to all these funding factors. These traditional funding sources for most financial institutions dried up almost instantly, and the Federal Reserve decided to intervene in funding markets by means of swap lines and MBS and CP direct purchases. Before linking the behavior of these funding markets and the LtA, it is useful to summarize the behavior of these determinants and their correlations with LtA in each given sub-period.
-The characteristics of the unsecured funding market is captured by the spread between 3-month LIBOR and 3-month US Overnight Index Swap (OIS) rates. A rise in the differential implies that financial institutions become less willing to lend to each other due to problems in creditworthiness.
We label this proxy as UNSECUREDF. Figure 4 suggests that its average and volatility increase monotonically from pre-crisis to credit crisis periods, displaying a 61% correlation with LtA during the latter period. The differential tends to close during the after-crisis, though still with higher volatility and correlation values compared to both the pre-crisis and liquidity crisis periods.
[Insert Figure 4 Here] -The characteristics of the secured funding market is captured by the spread between US Treasury repo rates and US Agency Mortgage-Backed Security (MBS) rates. This spread captures the difference in value between high-quality collateral vs. low quality collateral securities. Gabaix et al. (2007) argue that the MBS markets plays an important funding role, and may affect limits to arbitrage. An increase in the MBS spread signals an increase in the risk premium related to collateral value, affecting the ability to leverage risky-arbitrage positions. This can be treated synonymously as the leverage constraints of Gromb and Vayanos (2010) . Moreover, Sarkar and Shrader (2010) argue that this is a good proxy for funding illiquidity, and that if the secured funding is indeed stressed, it is likely that the unsecured funding will also be in trouble. We label this proxy as SECUREDF. Similar to the previous funding cost, Figure 5 reveals that SECUREDF also increases monotonically from the pre-crisis to the credit crisis in terms of average, volatility and correlation with LtA. The correlation with LtA is 63% during the credit turmoil.
[Insert Figure 5 Here]
-The third component is the commercial paper (CP) issuance. The majority of commercial papers are issued by the financial sector in order to raise cheap capital at short-term interest rates. Under normal market conditions, interest rates on commercial paper have been historically just slightly higher than those on Treasury bills and lower than LIBOR. Before the crisis, market players regarded most CP of major financial institutions as a high-quality safe asset. Figure 6 reveals that CP tends to decrease from pre-crisis to credit crisis in terms of average, volatility and correlation with LtA. The correlation with LtA is 47% during the credit crisis phase.
[Insert Figure 6 Here]
Global Macro Factors
• Macro-Activity Risk : We extract an index of macroeconomic activity using Ludvigson and Ng (2009) approach. They use dynamic factor analysis to estimate a set of common factors from a panel of 132 real, nominal, and monetary measures of economic activity. They show that such a procedure to synthesize information from macroeconomic activity possesses strong predictive content for excess bond returns, explaining 26% of the one-year-ahead variation in returns, and importantly, contain information that is unspanned by bond yields. They argue that part of the success of using this procedure depends on crosssectional averaging that irons out temporal instabilities that may be present in individual series. This allows to better isolate the characteristics related to marginal utilities, which are more directly linked to the factors that must be common across a large panel of economic fundamentals. Their findings suggest that macro fundamentals (i.e. real and inflation factors) do carry significance information to explain expected excess returns in the sovereign bond market. Unlike Ludvigson and Ng, however, we exclude price based information from the panel in order to interpret this variable as a pure macro factor and allow for an easier distinction between macro-activity and the other risk factors. After removing price based information from the panel we end up with a 102 cross-sectional units. 19 We label this factor as the LN-Macro factor. The conjecture is that deteriorating macroeconomic conditions can create constraints on financial institutions, ultimately affecting limits to arbitrage.
• Term Premia: Diebold and Li (2006) show that slope factor of the US yield curve is closely related to macroeconomic activity (capacity utilization). It has also been argued that arbitrageurs fund their activities using short maturity instruments, often rolling overnight positions. 20 Vayanos and Vila (2009) study a theoretical model in which investors have preferences for long maturity bonds, while arbitrageurs can move along the term structure, and are able to invest in all maturities and incorporate information (about current and future short rates) into bond prices. Following a demand shock, arbitrageurs take advantage of this opportunity by shorting (and longing) specific bonds across the term structure, accordingly. Following this argument, the slope of the term structure is informative about the relative cost of arbitrageurs to fund risky arbitrage. We define the US slope as the difference between 10 year Treasury bonds and 3 month LIBOR yields, and label it as USD Slope factor.
• Equity Risk Premium Factor : A vast macro-finance literature find evidence of predictability in asset prices. Campbell and Cochrane (1999) motivate the findings in the context of a model with time-varying risk aversion due to habit persistence. Bansal and Yaron (2005) argue that a significant component of predictability is due to a pure cash-flow channel when shocks to cash flows are very persistent, and utilities display a preference for early resolution of uncertainty (Epstein-Zin). In both cases, dividend yields have predictive power for future expected excess returns. Thus, we use the weekly S&P500 dividend yield to control for hidden priced state variables that may affect market-wide expected returns.
Local Risk Factors
19 Examples of price variables removed include: S&P dividend yield, the Federal Funds (FF) rate; 10 year T-bond; 10 year -FF term spread; Baa -FF default spread; and the Dollar-Yen exchange rate. 20 Litterman and Scheinkman (1991) argue that the term structure slope drives a significant portion of interest rates.
• particular interest given our focus, however, is that the correlation with LtA rise from 15% during the pre-crisis period to 67% in credit crisis period.
Global Uncertainty Factor
• Subjective Uncertainty Factors: Starting from Knight (1921) , part of the literature claims that asset prices reflect both risk and uncertainty. While the former is defined in terms of measurable quantity that directly affects realized marginal utility in equilibrium (i.e. known unknowns), the latter refers to the effect of unmeasurable quantities (i.e. unknown unknowns). Gilboa uncertainty shocks, which jump up after major crisis events. In our context, we incorporate subjective uncertainty via the DIB factor, constructed as in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) . Then, we document the extent to which subjective belief heterogeneity is linked to changes in the LtA.
Methodology
We adopt a static approach to construct the term structure of yields and credit spreads to avoid imposing modeling assumptions on the dynamics of interest rates or default risk that may affect the results. To improve robustness, given the large scale dimension of the problem (two risk-free and two credit spread term structures), we follow Houweling et al. (2001) and use a joint estimation methodology. Instead of deriving spread curves by subtracting risk-free yields from risky yields, in this estimation method the two sets of parameters of the risk-free term structure and the credit risk premium curve are jointly estimated from a combined data set of bonds. This reduces the dimensionality of the problem and makes the results more robust.
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The US risk-free curve is estimated with 6-12 month London Interbank Offer Rates (LIBOR) at the shortend, and 1-30 year maturity US swap rates at the long end. The EU risk-free curve is estimated with 6-12 month Euro Interbank Offer Rates (EURIBOR) for short-end, and 1-30 year maturity euro swap rates for long-end of the term structure. 29 The risk-free curves are modeled as Svensson (1994) functions (each with six parameters) and the credit risk premium curves are modeled as Nelson-Siegel functions (each with four parameters), as discussed in Nelson and Siegel (1987) . Shea (1985) and Nychka (1995) . 29 The details of the model are available from the authors upon request.
Panel Regressions
Given the two credit spread curves, we estimate three-equation fixed-effects panel regressions on each maturity and each subsample. Because of the potential persistence in the spreads, all regressions are run in differences: The independent variable is the first-difference of the absolute LtA, and the dependent variables are the first-differences of the potential determinants discussed in Section 4.
30 In order to capture the meanreverting property of LtA, we also included the first lagged variables, which also shed light on the autocorrelated nature of the LtA fluctuations. In the fixed effects model we assume that intercepts represent country-specific shifts. As Nickell (1981) points out, fixed-effects model may suffer from statistical biases when the number of individuals are greater than time periods. In our context, the number of individual variables never exceeds the time length, so our methodology should not suffer from this drawback.
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Price Discovery
Eq. (7) suggests that a single issuer's credit spreads across two currencies can be linked by a simple arbitrage relation. Having observed that there exists an empirical difference between the two spreads, a natural question then arises: how can the financial markets persist in pricing usd credit risks differently than their euro equivalents? Although our main interest is to investigate macro level determinants of persistent deviations from the equilibrium, there might also be micro-structural factors (i.e. the natural habitat of arbitrageurs, the location of traders, the funding currency of trading operations). This leads to an investigation of the differences of the information contents of credit risks across currencies. As discussed previously, the EM bonds denominated in two currencies can be treated as two homogeneous assets. Given that the risk premiums are not identical, it becomes interesting to evaluate (a) whether a bond in one currency provides a more timely information than its equivalent in the other currency and (b) how this result relates to the properties of the LtA. In other words, we seek to understand which bond retains a greater contribution to price discovery. As defined by Lehmann (2002) , price discovery can be described as timely incorporation of the trading activities into market prices. If usd and euro Emerging Markets bonds were trading in one market place, the price discovery would take place in one single market. However we know that these bonds are traded in multiple regions, mainly in Eurozone and USA. Since the order flow of the Eurobonds are fragmented, the price discovery would be split among these markets.
There are two popular ways to conduct price discovery analysis, namely information share (IS) measure suggested by Hasbrouck (1995) and component share (CS) measure suggested by Gonzalo and Granger (1995) .
Both measures rely on the vector error-correction models (VECM) of market prices. IS assumes that price volatility reflects new information, and it allows for the correlation among multiple markets via the variance and covariance of price innovations. Following Blanco et al. (2005), we calculate the IS measures to find the contribution of usd credit risk premiums to euro credit risk premiums. It is necessary to run VECM to carry out this analysis. First, we test for the cointegration between the corresponding credit spreads to see if VECM can be applied. 32 We conduct this analysis for the entire period and not for each sub-sample period. The reasoning lies in the fact that we wish to observe a long-term price discovery relationship among bonds. Furthermore, the sample size becomes considerably reduced when sub-samples are concerned independently, and the argument 30 We use the absolute LtA rather than original LtA to facilitate the interpretation of the signs of the slope coefficients. 31 In this paper, we did not use random-effects model. As Hausman (1978) points out, the random effects model assumes independence between the individual effect and the independent variables. If this assumption is violated, random effects estimator is inconsistent and biased. On the other hand, fixed effects estimator does not suffer from such failure of orthogonality. See Maddala (1971) and Mundlak (1978) for the issue of specification. In addition, see Nerlove and Balestra (1966) for he bias and efficiency of the estimators in random and fixed models. 32 For cointegration, we used Johansen's cointegration test, proposed by Johansen (1988) , and we determined the number of lags according to the Akaike information criterion.
of long-term relationship no longer becomes valid. 33 Having observed that cointegration exists, we run the VECM shown in Table 7 with the given coefficients A1 and A2. If it is the euro risk premium that retains the significant contribution to the price discovery, then A1 should be statistically significant. Similarly, if usd risk premium has the significant contribution, then A2 should be statistically significant. If both coefficients are significant, then the two risk premiums have significant contribution to the price discovery. The contribution of the usd risk premium to price discovery is defined by the Hasbrouck measures specified in 
Results
The LtA is highly time-varying and state-dependent. In the pre-crisis period, it is insignificantly different from zero, but it becomes large and extremely volatile during the crisis, suggesting a limited arbitrageur participation in these sovereign bond markets. This is especially acute during the credit crisis, which includes the Lehman collapse. The most striking feature of LtA during this period is its persistence. In the after-crisis period, LtA gradually converges back to the levels seen during the liquidity crisis sub-period. as opposed to funding factors, sentiment, perception of tail risk, and uncertainty. If funding factors played a role, which one of the funding markets played a more significant role (unsecured swap market, secured funding markets, commercial paper)? What happened after the crisis is a difficult issue to resolve. The equilibrium implications may be related to the interventions of the U.S. and European Governments or simply to an improvement of the economic fundamentals. Traditional asset pricing models often make it difficult to address these questions given that equilibria are traditionally assumed to be Pareto optimal. We will explore these questions empirically. Given the vast empirical finance literature that studies the asset pricing implications of both cash flow and discount factor (beta) risk, we organize our explanatory variables related to shocks to macro fundamentals in two main groups. In the first group, we consider those factors representing cash-flow risk, such as LN-Macro; in the second group, we consider factors that are more directly related to discount factor risk: the Equity Risk Premium factors, Percieved Tail Event Risk, and Subjective Uncertainty factors.
Panel Regressions
In all panels, lagged LtA is statistically very significant with negative slope coefficients, indicating that the process is persistent and mean-reverting. In the pre-crisis period, the slope coefficient is about -0.36% and it becomes -0.50% during the crisis and after-crisis, indicating stronger mean-reversion during the market turmoil. With regards to the economic explanatory variables, we find that in three different periods (i.e. pre-crisis, crisis or after-crisis) the dynamics of LtA is explained by different groups of explanatory variables. 33 It should still be pointed out that the entire sample period obviously covers major structural breaks. This may affect our results. We repeated the analysis and computed Hasbrouck's measures independently for each three sub-samples as well. We find that results that hold for the entire period holds to a great extent also for each sub-sample.
We also find that bond maturity plays an important role: bonds with different maturities have different sensitivities to different risk factors. Furthermore, our results show evidence that risk premiums are mainly driven by U.S. risk factors. This finds support also in Longstaff et al. (2008) , who argue that credit risk premiums of major EM are less sensitive to local economic factors than they are to U.S. stock and global bond markets.
[Insert Table 5 here]
1. Pre-Crisis Period: As shown in Table 5 , R 2 values during the pre-crisis period range from 19% to 25%.
The findings suggest that during this period, the economic explanatory variables, even when significant, have low statistical powers. The best predictor of future LtA is simply the lagged value of the LtA. Perceived Tail Event Risk is found insignificant for all maturity buckets, whereas the Secured Funding and Sentiment Risk are found statistically significant only for the 1-3 year maturity. Furthermore, the Friction factor for Brazil (i.e bid-ask spreads) is found significant for all maturities, except for the longest end of the term structure. 34 Nevertheless, the same pattern is not observed for Mexico and Turkey, which makes it relatively difficult to generalize that bond-specific illiquidity is a consistently dominant factor in the cross-sectional variations in LtA. Interestingly, the subjective uncertainty factor (i.e. DiB) is found strongly significant for 1-3 and 3-6 year maturities and dividend yield is found significant for 3-6 and 6-9 year maturities. In fact, Figure 9 displays that Global Funding Risk has the highest marginal contribution to LtA in pre-crisis, specifically for the very short-end of the term structure. Nonetheless, it should be noticed that the explanatory powers of all variables are very low, suggesting that apart from lagged values of LtA, none of the market risk factors are relevant. This does not come as a surprise, given that LtA values are already approximately zero during this period. [Insert Figure 9 here] 34 We also used bond-specific trading volumes and found them to be insignificant in all periods.
Perhaps surprisingly, the Unsecured Funding risk factor is found statistically insignificant. This comes as a surprise to us, given the extensive debate during the crisis that focused on this issue and that induced the Federal Reserve to intervene and address directly the wide levels of the LIBOR/OIS spread in the unsecured interbank market. On the other hand, the impact of the spread between Mortgage-Backed Securities (MBS) and Treasury repo rates, which is a proxy for the liquidity in the secured funding market by comparing highly-liquid vs. less liquid collateral, is significant. The stressed value of these spreads have been recognized by the Federal Reserve, which eventually intervened at the end of 2008 with a significant program of MBS purchases. 35 This finding is also consistent with the work of Bernanke and Gertler (1989) that suggest that collateral values can be severely impaired in case of negative shocks to economic activity, and can play a role on the efficient allocation of capital. An increase in sentiment risk, high market implied volatility, and rising funding costs with less-than-liquid instruments increases limits to arbitrage. An additional interesting finding relates to the role of dividend yields, which are found statistically significant for the 9-15 year bonds, supporting the argument that predictability is indeed driven by a latent risk factor affecting the price of risk. The long run bonds, as opposed to their short-term equivalents, are more sensitive to this risk factor. On the other hand, the Term Premia and bond-specific Friction factors have a negligible impact.
[Insert Table 6 here]
When the crisis period is divided into two further sub-samples, namely the liquidity and credit crises, respectively, interesting results emerge. Table 6 reveals that during the liquidity crisis, R 2 range between 23% and 30%, which is slightly higher than in the pre-crisis period, but much smaller than compared to the credit crisis sub-period. The CP (commercial paper) factor is found strongly significant for 1-3 year bonds. This is interesting, because while the commercial papers of large financial institutions were regarded as short-term, safe-debt instruments, this perception changed with the collapse of Bearn Stearn's two hedge fund on 31 July 2007 and the suspension of BNP Paribas's three investment vehicle on 7 August 2007. Commercial papers were widely used as collaterals by these investment banks, and money market participants became increasingly reluctant to buy these assets. The lack of liquidity in the money market reached a point that convinced the Federal Reserve to directly purchase commercial paper for the first time in its history.
During the second phase of the two sub-periods (i.e. credit crisis), following the Lehman collapse, the R 2 increases dramatically up to 76% for the long-end of the term structure. As displayed in Figure 9 , the most important explanatory variable is the Global Sentiment, explaining about 18% -25% of the total variation of LtA for longer term maturities. It is then followed by Global Funding and Global Macro risk factors, explaining between 12% -16%, and 4% -16%, respectively, of the total variation of the LtA of longer maturity bonds. On average, the marginal contribution of Perceived Tail Event Risk and
Friction factors rise with the maturity of the bond, suggesting that the long-end of the term structure is comparably more sensitive to hedging risk and liquidity constraints. It should be noticed that the Global Macro factor is more relevant for longer maturity bonds (9-15 years): in this section of the term structure, it has the second largest impact (after Global Sentiment). This confirms that long-term bonds are comparably more sensitive to macro fundamentals. This finding is quite interesting since it shows us that not only the funding conditions but also the deteriorating macroeconomic conditions emanating from U.S can create constraints on financial institutions, ultimately affecting limits to arbitrage. According to International Monetary Fund (2008) most of the developed and emerging markets experienced a massive decline in world trade activity of about 30%. This might be due to the rising counterparty risk in financial markets, which significantly reduced the trade credit to support import and export. On the other hand, the impact of Global Funding retains a higher marginal relevance than the Global Macro risks for 6-9 years maturities. This suggests that there is an interplay between these two variables, and that the ranking of their marginal impact depends on the bond maturity. Furthermore, the Subjective Uncertainty factor (i.e. DiB) is also found statistically significant all maturities (except 6-9 years), providing evidence in support of the findings in Buraschi and Jiltsov (2006) , with regards to the impact of heterogeneous belief. It might be noticed that LN-Macro, Equity Risk Premium, Percieved Tail Event Risk and Subjective Uncertainty factors all have significant explanatory power for the dynamics of LtA, thus suggesting that both the cash-flow and discount-rate factors are almost equally important.
3. After-Crisis Period: As for the after-crisis period, the R 2 drops considerably compared to the previous periods, ranging from 22% to 44%. The contribution is mostly due to Local Risk factors (i.e.
EM-CDSI)
, which is statistically significant for all maturities, except for the 3-6 years. Dividend yields are once again economically relevant only for the 9-15 year maturities, validating that changes in the price of risk can affect LtA. Nonetheless, the explanatory power of these shocks are limited, implying that Eurobond markets are in the process of stabilizing.
Social Welfare and Policy Implications
It is possible to think the Federal Reserve interventions in the financial markets in three major phases: Liquidity Phase, Credit Phase and Uncertainty Phase. In the first phase, the Federal Reserve was concerned with the provision of liquidity to local and international markets via injection of capital to US banks and extension of global swap lines. The main goal was to reduce balance sheet constraints through Central Bank monetary easing. At this stage, the Federal Reserve developed a new policy to extend liquidity directly to borrowers and investors in central credit markets. According to Bernanke (2009) , the Federal Reserve also attempted to reduce roll-over risk via financing bank purchases of commercial papers from money market mutual funds. In the second phase, the Federal Reserve started to address credit risk concerns via purchases of mortgage-backed securities, given that liquidity provision failed to solve the problem fully. This means that even though the level of liquidity had been sufficient, uncertainty over asset quality, capital and credit risk continued to impair the lending activities of financial intermediaries. In the third phase, which is quite different compared to phase 1 or 2 or any previous historical experience, the Federal Reserve addressed more directly market uncertainty and tail risk perception by implementing explicit stress tests on a broad set of banks and financial institutions. From our results, we observe that the elimination of LtA coincided with the third phase.
During these three phases, the Federal Reserves took unconventional measures to address the functioning of the financial markets. It is interesting to explore which of these measures had the largest effects on LtA: it is a norm that the LtA in long-term bonds reach their minimum values considerably slower than their short-term equivalents, validating the sensitivity of long-term bonds.
arbitrageurs. At this stage, most US banks began increasing their lending activities, thus relieving prevailing market frictions. In accordance with Gromb and Vayanos (2010) , where arbitrageurs tend to collateralize their positions, we observe initially that the impairment in collateral values prevented wide arbitrageurs participation. While the Fed intervention in mortgage-backed markets indeed helped unlocking secured credit markets, we find that this step has certainly not been sufficient. Perception of Tail Event Risk (proxy by VIX) was still very significant at the beginning of the second phase of the Government program. We needed to wait until the announcement of the stress tests to see a recompression of LtA. The impact of the Perceived Tail Event Risk factor is completely eliminated after the stress test announcements, which suggest that it has been successful in quickly reducing subjective uncertainty. Based on our results, we find that the initial interventions had been ineffective to help LtA compression. 40 The following measures, however, helped LtA values to converge back to their pre-crisis levels.
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To summarize, the theory of Limits to Arbitrage is an important stream of literature that can help our understanding of certain financial market anomalies. Our investigation on the dynamic properties of the limits to arbitrage around a period of market distress shows what type of roles the public policies and market interventions can (or cannot) play. As argued by Bernarke (2009), the Federal Reserve intervened via asset purchase programs and as a lender of last resort, when financial markets were illiquid and impaired by balance sheet constraints. Vast amount of government resources have been used to help the financial sector: this has strong social and welfare implications. Not all these measures, however, have been as successful as hoped.
Price Discovery
The apparent arbitrage opportunities in the distressed markets, which give rise to the risks discussed earlier on, can be either persistent and survive in the long-run, or still be essentially a short-term phenomenon. To investigate this question, we run a cointegration analysis. We find that both the usd and euro risk premiums are found to be cointegrated for each bond pair during the whole sample period. The corresponding risk premiums are also found highly cointegarted during each sub-sample period, including the credit crisis.
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This is interesting since it shows that the no-arbitrage deviations that we discussed earlier are short-term in nature even during particularly stressed period of time. A natural question, however, emerges: Is there a consistent lead/lag relation across these bonds? Is price discovery usually faster in the usd market so that usd risk premium leads the equivalent in euro? Are there persistent characteristics in the lead/lag relationships between the bond issued by the same issuer but denominated in different currencies? Similar to Blanco et al.
(2005) we conduct the price discovery analysis via Hasbrouck's IS measure to investigate the dynamic behavior of price of euro and usd credit spreads. We report upper, lower and averages of Hasbrouck bounds in Table   7 . Our findings reveal that for Brazilian and Mexican bonds the A2 coefficients are positive and statistically significant, implying that the usd-denominated bonds strictly lead their euro-denominated equivalents in terms of price discovery. For Turkey, however, the opposite pattern emerges: A1 coefficient is negative and statistically significant, implying that the euro-denominated bonds significantly contribute more than their usd-denominated equivalents in all maturity buckets. Taking into account all maturities available, we find that the contributions of usd-denominated bonds, on average, are 67% and 66% for Brazil and Mexico, respectively, and 34% for Turkey. This result seems linked to a previous cross-section pattern: the euro risk premiums are more volatile than their usd equivalents in Mexico and Brazil, regardless of the period; the exact opposite pattern is observed in Turkey. Consistent with Table 2 , this also implies that the risk premiums having the lead in price discovery maintain also the least volatility.
[Insert Table 7 here] These findings suggest that the price discovery in Emerging Market bonds may be regional, or specific to the natural habitat of traders. This also shows that the nature of the reference-funding market is important in defining the currency in which price discovery occurs. In the case of Turkey, the majority of the market-making activity is funded in euro and conducted by European banks. The opposite holds for Brazil and Mexico. This might have important implications for LtA. For instance, a European hedge fund may have a preferred habitat in the euro-specific region. However, due to his natural habitat, he/she may have limited access to usd (or even euro) during times of crisis, which would in turn generate a demand/supply shock in the market. Knowing that capital is less available to the investor during the crisis period of time, arbitrageur would also avoid the transaction, and hence the LtA distortion. Gromb and Vayanos (2002) formalize this by showing that if the arbitrageurs lack the sufficient capital to cover the variations in both margin accounts of the segmented asset markets, then they might not be able to eliminate the price discrepancies.
Conclusion
We contribute to the existing literature by introducing an empirical notion of limits to arbitrage (LtA) in the context of Emerging Markets during the credit crisis, and investigating its determinants. We study the role of sentiment risk, macro-fundamental risks, uncertainty, funding and liquidity costs on the willingness of agent to act on near arbitrage opportunities. First, it is proven that under no-arbitrage condition, the LtA proxy should be zero. Our findings suggest, however, that LtA is time-varying and state dependent. While it is close to zero during pre-crisis, it becomes large and volatile during the market turmoil, and tends to converge back to initial levels during the after-crisis. This suggests that while arbitrageurs were able (or willing) to take positions in stable pre-crisis period, their risk-aversion or funding abilities prevented them from providing liquidity to the market during the crisis, and driving asset prices back to fundamentals. In the end, since LtA displays fundamental characteristics in pre-crisis, and behavioral biases in crisis periods, it can be argued that for the corresponding bond markets, we find evidence in support of both fundamental and behavioral arguments.
Our findings also provide support that the behavior of LtA is state-dependent. The significance of risk factors depends on the subsample period, time-to-maturity, prevailing market conditions and the choice of determinants. The impacts are more pronounced for longer-term maturity bonds. The panel regressions explain between 18% to 24% in pre-crisis, 23% to 30% in liquidity crisis, 34% to 76% in credit crisis and 22% to 44% in after-crisis period. While Global Sentiment, Percieived Tail Event Risk and Funding constraints have negligible explanatory powers in the pre-crisis and after-crisis period, their impact becomes dramatic in the credit crisis phase. This suggests that arbitrageurs are affected by market sentiment during market turmoils, affecting their operations. Furthermore, funding costs (Secure Funding risk) affects the LtA via the spread that captures collateral values. However, these are mainly significant only when markets are dislocated. Otherwise, they do not have a major role in explaining the dynamics of LtA (during normal market periods).
The impact of Macro-activity Risk is larger for longer maturity bonds, and their relevance becomes even bigger than the Global Funding factors. Heterogeneous beliefs and Equity Premium factors are also all significant, especially for the long-end of the term structure. Given that level of LtA increases with time-to-maturity, our findings give evidence that long term bonds are more sensitive to market shocks, and hence arbitrageurs tend to become more risk-averse. Friction (liquidity) factors are found to have lower impact than wasexpected during the liquidity crisis. This is almost counter-intuitive as one would have expected (traditional) liquidity factors to be most relevant during what we call the liquidity crisis. This result suggests that we may have to reconsider the way we proxy for liquidity risk. Finally, we find that the smoothing of LtA coincides with the US Government intervention via TARP and MBS purchases, though the real impact coincides with stress tests announcements. This suggests that the actions of US Government relieved the friction between financial institutions and investors, helping markets to stabilize over time, and decreasing the risk-aversion of market participants. This obviously bears welfare and policy implications left for further research. Our findings also suggest that price discovery process tends to be regional in emerging markets: while usd-denominated bonds significantly lead their euro equivalents in Brazil and Mexico, the exact opposite relationship is observed in Turkey. As another important finding, the existence of currency-dependence suggests that employing usd as de facto currency to price all other foreign currency-denominated credit products is empirically incorrect for credit risk modeling. Curve estimations and credit pricing models concerning the risk premiums (across two currencies) should be built independently for each corresponding currency, even though the maturity and the issuer of both bonds are the same. The generality of our examination is limited to the fact that so far we do not take into account the effect of country-specific fundamentals (i.e. usd exports vs. euro exports, usd reserves vs. euro reserves etc.), due to infrequency of data. Further research may be carried out on the role of country-specific market volatilities. Although the main focus here is on Emerging Markets sovereigns, the methodology and the intuition presented in this paper can be applied directly to multinational corporations, which issue debt in more than one currency. 
The panel includes the absolute LtA series (i.e. ABSLtA of three countries: Turkey, Brazil and Mexico), and the first ABSLtA lags. Variables are made stationary by taking first-differences. All independent variables, except the bid-ask spreads are assigned common coefficient values. The bid-ask spreads are on usd-denominated bonds, and are denoted as BIDASK. They are both bond-and maturity-specific. The secured funding factor in US, denoted as Securedf , is maturity-specific. Other variables are neither bond-nor maturity-specific. The unsecured funding factor in US is denoted as U nsecuredf . The EM − CDSI is the Markit CDX Emerging Markets Index, and EM − M SCI is the Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Emerging Market equity index. Moreover, F G − Liq is the Fontaine and Garcia Liquidity factor, DiB is the disagreement in belief factor, LN − M acro is the Ludvigson and Ng aggregate market risk factor, and finally DIV Y is the S&P500 dividend yield, namely the Equity Premium factor. The sample is divided into three periods: pre-crisis, crisis and after-crisis periods. Quotes are discarded whenever a bond has less than 6 months to maturity. Quotes are included whenever a bond has more than 6 months since issuance. Average parameter estimates are reported below, and the associated t-statistics for each parameter are displayed immediately beneath. The panel includes the absolute LtA series (i.e. ABSLtA of three countries: Turkey, Brazil and Mexico), and the first ABSLtA lags. Variables are made stationary by taking first-differences. All independent variables are the same as in Table 5 . The sample is divided into two periods: liquidity crisis and credit crisis. Average parameter estimates are reported below, and the associated t-statistics for each parameter are displayed immediately beneath with the coefficient of determinations, where (*) shows %95 and (**) shows %90 confidence interval.
Coefficients Liquidity Crisis Period
Credit Crisis Period Table 7: This table reports where $CS and ECS are the usd and euro credit risk premiums, respectively, and u 1t and u 2t are the error terms. We imposed the restriction that c 1 =1. The regressions are run using the optimal lags that are determined by AIC. Only the coefficients A1 and A2 are displayed in the table with t-statistics shown immediately below. Sx and Sy are the Hasbrouck bounds, and σ 1 , σ 2 , σ 12 are the standard deviations and covariance of the residual series, respectively. In the table SM is the arithmetic mean of two Hasbrouck. The Hasbrouck measures for finding the contribution of usd credit risk premiums to euro credit risk premiums are estimated by the following expressions: Figure 1 * The left column with USD5 and EUR5 displays the time-series of 5-year usd and eur risk premiums, respectively during each subsample across given countries. The right column with DSPREAD displays the time-series of 5-year currency dependence across given countries. BR stands for Brazil, MX for Mexico and TR for Turkey. The values are in percentages. Figure 2A * Each graph represents the LtA proxy of the specific maturity bucket of Brazil. In terms of maturity buckets, 1-3 years is denoted by 2 years, 3-6 years is denoted by 5 years, 6-9 years is denoted by 7 years and 9-15 years is denoted by 10 years. The graphs are divided into three subsamples: pre-crisis, crisis and after-crisis, accordingly. The values are in percentages. Figure 2B * Each graph represents the LtA proxy of the specific maturity bucket of Mexico. In terms of maturity buckets, 1-3 years is denoted by 2 years, 3-6 years is denoted by 5 years, 6-9 years is denoted by 7 years and 9-15 years is denoted by 10 years. The graphs are divided into three subsamples: pre-crisis, crisis and after-crisis, accordingly. The values are in percentages. Figure 2C * Each graph represents the LtA proxy of the specific maturity bucket of Turkey. In terms of maturity buckets, 1-3 years is denoted by 2 years, 3-6 years is denoted by 5 years, 6-9 years is denoted by 7 years and 9-15 years is denoted by 10 years. The graphs are divided into three subsamples: pre-crisis, crisis and after-crisis, accordingly. The values are in percentages.
Cross-Currency Credit Risk Premiums in Emerging Markets
Limit to Arbitrage in Brazil
Limit to Arbitrage in Mexico
Limit to Arbitrage in Turkey
Comparative Analysis of ABS (LtA) and Bid-Ask Spreads in Brazil Figure 3A * Each graph represents the maturity-specific differential between the absolute LtA and the bid-ask spreads of usd-denominated bonds of Brazil. The graphs are divided into three subsamples: pre-crisis, crisis and after-crisis, accordingly. The values are in percentages.
Comparative Analysis of ABS (LtA) and Bid-Ask Spreads in Mexico Figure 3B * Each graph represents the maturity-specific differential between the absolute LtA and the bid-ask spreads of usd-denominated bonds of Mexico. The graphs are divided into three subsamples: pre-crisis, crisis and after-crisis, accordingly. The values are in percentages.
Comparative Analysis of ABS (LtA) and Bid-Ask Spreads in Turkey Figure 3C * Each graph represents the maturity-specific differential between the absolute LtA and the bid-ask spreads of usd-denominated bonds of Turkey. The graphs are divided into three subsamples: pre-crisis, crisis and after-crisis, accordingly. The values are in percentages.
Unsecured Funding Costs and ABS LtA Figure 4 Secured Fundings Costs and ABS LtA Figure 5 Commercial Paper and ABS LtA Figure 6 Sentiment and ABS LtA Figure 7 VIX and ABS LtA Figure 8 Marginal Contribution of Regressors Figure 9 * The graphs display the marginal contribution of each market risk factor to the total R 2 . The values are in percentages. In order to obtain the contributions of each market risk factor, original panels are regressed by excluding the corresponding risk factors from panels. If P AN (1) denotes the total R 2 of the panel with all regressors, and P AN (2) f denotes the total R 2 of the the panels excluding the risk factor f, the marginal contribution of f (M C f ) is calculated as follows:
